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INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the group
formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham1 climbed
the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, Iraq, and
delivered his first sermon as Caliph of the Islamic State.2 This
sermon officially established a new Islamic caliphate in Iraq and
Syria.3 Prior to his announcement, Baghdadi’s group had attracted
thousands of foreign fighters to its cause,4 and, with the establishment of an official Islamic caliphate, would continue to attract
thousands more.5 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), approximately 300 of those foreign fighters were American
citizens.6
The declaration of an Islamic caliphate and the large amounts of
territory the group seized in mid-2014 rang alarm bells in Washington.7 In response, President Obama authorized a targeted airstrike
1. See Hannah Strange, Islamic State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Addresses Muslims
in
Mosul,
TELEGRAPH
(July
5,
2014,
3:25
PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-State-leaderAbu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html [https://perma.cc/Q8G2-X8UN].
Baghdadi recently died in an October 2019 raid conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces
in northwestern Syria. Rukmini Callimachi & Falih Hassan, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS
Leader Known for His Brutality, Is Dead at 48, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-dead.html
[https://perma.cc/44JU-ZLP3]. There has been significant debate over what to call Baghdadi’s
jihadist group, with various governments and media outlets alternating between the names
ISIS, ISIL, the Islamic State, and Daesh. See Faisal Irshaid, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One
Group, Many Names, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east27994277 [https://perma.cc/CNX4-FXZH] (describing the various names used to refer to
Baghdadi’s group). For reasons of clarity, this Note will refer to the group as the Islamic
State, the name the group itself has used since June 2014. See id.
2. See JOBY WARRICK , BLACK FLAGS: THE RISE OF ISIS 304-05 (2015).
3. See id.
4. See THE SOUFAN GRP., FOREIGN FIGHTERS: AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF THE FLOW OF
FOREIGN FIGHTERS INTO SYRIA AND IRAQ 4 (2015), http://soufangroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EYZ-DMNF].
5. See id.; Rukmini Callimachi, Fight to Retake Last ISIS Territory Begins, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria.html
[https://perma.cc/FX4U-KJHF].
6. See ALEXANDER MELEAGROU -HITCHENS ET AL., THE TRAVELERS: AMERICAN JIHADISTS
IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 5 (2018), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Travelers
AmericanJihadistsinSyriaandIraq.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKL8-LXKX].
7. See BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, Foreword to MELEAGROU -HITCHENS ET AL., supra note
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campaign against the group.8 To justify these strikes, the Obama
administration relied upon the 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force (2001 AUMF).9 The 2001 AUMF, which Congress
passed in the immediate wake of the September 11th terrorist
attacks, broadly authorizes the President to use military force
against the parties responsible for those attacks.10 After its passage,
the executive branch used the 2001 AUMF as the main legal
justification for U.S. anti-terror operations against al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and the associated forces of either group.11 These antiterror operations included the detention of terrorists as well as
traditional military operations.12
Both the Obama and Trump administrations have continued to
rely upon the 2001 AUMF to justify the use of force against terrorist
organizations across the world, including the Islamic State.13

6, at ix (quoting United States Senators as saying, “[W]e are in the most dangerous position
we ever have been as a nation” and “[military action must be taken] before we all get killed
here at home”).
8. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement Addressing the United States’
Response to the Crisis in Iraq (Aug. 7, 2014, 9:30 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president
[https://perma.cc/73E3-65X6].
9. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)); see also Press Release, White House Office of the Press
Sec’y, Background Conference Call on the President’s Address to the Nation (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/background-conference-callpresidents-address-nation [https://perma.cc/JDW9-VHRD] (stating that the 2001 AUMF
provides the statutory authority for the President’s airstrike campaign against the Islamic
State).
10. MATTHEW C. WEED , CONG . RESEARCH SERV., R43983, 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE
OF MILITARY FORCE : ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION 1 (2015).
11. See Authorization for Use of Military Force After Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement of Sen. Menendez,
Chairman) [hereinafter AUMF Hearings], https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/052
114_Transcript_Authorization%20for%20Use%20of%20Military%20Force%20After%20Ira
q%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9XC-TB34].
12. See Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After
9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 125 (2013).
13. See AUMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 8 (statement of Hon. Stephen W. Preston, Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def.) (“The Department of Defense relies on the AUMF in ... military
operations against al-Qaeda and associated forces ... and detention operations.”); Lt. Col.
Daniel L. Davis, Abuse of the 2001 AUMF Weakens Our National Security, HILL (Feb. 28,
2018, 3:45 PM) (describing the use of the 2001 AUMF by the Bush, Obama, and Trump
administrations), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/376067-abuse-of-the-2001aumf-weakens-our-national-security [https://perma.cc/7LAW-3L6A].
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However, there has been uncertainty over whether the 2001 AUMF
applies to the Islamic State,14 which has led to questions concerning
the legality of using it to justify the continued use of force against
the Islamic State and its members.15
One such legal question was the central issue in Doe v. Mattis, a
habeas corpus case that addressed the rights of a U.S.-citizen
Islamic State fighter who had been detained as an enemy combatant
by the U.S. government.16 On September 11, 2017, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured Doe—an unnamed dual U.S.-Saudi
citizen who had been fighting for the Islamic State—at a checkpoint
in Syria.17 After learning that Doe was a U.S. citizen, the SDF
transferred custody of Doe to the U.S. military.18 Upon obtaining
custody of Doe, the U.S. government concluded, after a four-month
investigation (during which Doe remained in custody),19 that there

14. See Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s Power to Make
War, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014), https://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/
[https://perma.cc/4XJ8-PPXM] (stating the Islamic States “loose affiliation” to al-Qaeda makes
Obama’s application of the AUMF “presidential unilateralism masquerading as implausible
statutory interpretation”); Steve Vladeck, ISIL as al Qaeda: Three Reactions, LAWFARE (Sept.
11, 2014, 1:52 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/isil-al-qaeda-three-reactions [https://perma.
cc/M5R2-4XFR] (discussing the reactions of legal scholars to Obama’s announcement that the
Islamic State falls within the 2001 AUMF).
15. See Wells Bennett, The 2001 AUMF Covers 2014 Counterterrorism Operations Against
ISIS?, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:05 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2001-aumf-covers2014-counterterrorism-operations-against-isis [https://perma.cc/MUW2-KNBW] (stating that
the application of the 2001 AUMF “in Iraq and Syria against ISIS ... seems like quite a
stretch”); Robert Chesney, The 2001 AUMF: From Associated Forces to (Disassociated)
Successor Forces, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2014, 11:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2001aumf-associated-forces-disassociated-successor-forces [https://perma.cc/YHF6-URYK] (stating
that the Obama Administration’s application of the 2001 AUMF to the Islamic State is
“stunning from a legal perspective”); Benjamin Wittes, Not Asking the Girl to Dance, LAWFARE
(Sept. 10, 2014, 9:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/not-asking-girl-dance [https://perma.
cc/Q8JL-CZUG] (stating that it is “extremely implausible” that the scope of the 2001 AUMF
encompasses the Islamic State).
16. Robert Chesney, A Primer on the Legal Dispute in Doe v. Mattis, LAWFARE (Mar. 9,
2018, 8:13 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/primer-legal-dispute-doe-v-mattis
[https://perma.cc/P8G7-FTKA].
17. Respondent’s Factual Return at 2, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D.D.C. 2018)
(No. 1:17-cv-02069-TSC).
18. Id.
19. The government took Doe into custody in mid-September 2017 and filed its first
response to Doe’s habeas claim in mid-February 2018, in which it argued that Doe should
remain in custody. See id.
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were sufficient factual20 and legal21 bases to detain Doe as an enemy
combatant. The government rested its legal argument on “three
independent bases: The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force, the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq, and the President’s Authority under Article II.”22
In response, Doe challenged the government’s legal authority to
detain him.23 Doe claimed that (1) there must be a clear statutory
grant from Congress allowing for the lawful detention of U.S.
citizens for the government’s stated purpose; and (2) the 2001
AUMF does not provide the clear statutory grant authorizing the
specific detention of Doe.24 In October of 2018, Doe reached a
settlement with the U.S. government and was released in Bahrain
before a court could adjudicate the legal merits of his case.25
Doe’s26 situation—the indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen as an
enemy combatant—is one that has rarely reared its head in the
recent years of the war on terror.27 However, in early January of
2019, Kurdish forces captured two American citizens in Syria—
Warren Christopher Clark and Zaid Abed al-Hamid—who have been
accused of fighting for the Islamic State.28 Additionally, President
Trump recently ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from along
the Syria-Turkey border, which could potentially result in the
20. See id. at 3-4.
21. See id. at 3.
22. Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return at 1, Doe, 288 F. Supp. 3d
195 (“[T]he executive lacks the legal authority to detain [Doe].”).
24. Id. at 2-3; Chesney, supra note 16.
25. See Robert Chesney, Doe v. Mattis Ends With a Transfer and a Cancelled Passport:
Lessons Learned, LAWFARE (Oct. 29, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doe-vmattis-ends-transfer-and-cancelled-passport-lessons-learned [https://perma.cc/V39T-KJGZ]
(“[Thirteen] months passed here without a merits ruling.”).
26. As a result of his release, Doe’s real name was revealed as Abdulrahman Ahmad
Alsheikh; however, for clarity purposes, this Note will continue to refer to him as John Doe.
See Chesney, supra note 25.
27. See Robert Chesney, An American Enemy Combatant Case? The News Out of DOD,
and What Might Happen Next, LAWFARE (Sept. 15, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/american-enemy-combatant-case-news-out-dod-and-what-might-happen-next
[https://perma.cc/SKK4-KKGS].
28. See Louisa Loveluck & Erin Cunningham, 2 Americans Accused of Fighting for ISIS
Are Captured by Kurds in Syria, WA S H . PO S T (Jan. 6, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/2-americans-accused-of-fighting-for-isisare-captured-by-kurds-in-syria/2019/01/06/afb8dd54-11f5-11e9-ab79-30cd4f7926f2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5NAD-9EC5].
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release of 11,000 Islamic State fighters, 2000 of whom are foreign
fighters.29 The captures of Doe, Clark, and al-Hamid, combined with
the recent territorial losses the Islamic State has suffered and the
potential release of thousands of foreign Islamic State fighters from
SDF detention,30 make it increasingly likely that the U.S. government will again face the need to detain a U.S.-citizen Islamic State
fighter.31
This Note proposes that the current legal authority the United
States relies on to detain these persons—the 2001 AUMF—does not
provide an adequate justification for the detention of Islamic State
fighters who are U.S. citizens. This Note argues that despite a
marriage of convenience, the Islamic State’s organizational and
operational differences from al-Qaeda make it a factually distinct
organization.32 Because the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are two
different entities, the Islamic State falls outside the scope of the
2001 AUMF.33 Thus, the 2001 AUMF should not apply to the
detention of U.S.-citizen Islamic State fighters because the government’s detention authority rests on the Islamic State falling within the purview of the 2001 AUMF.34

29. See Robert Chesney, Will Abandoning the Kurds Result in the Mass Release of Islamic State Fighters?, LAWFARE (Oct. 7, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/willabandoning-kurds-result-mass-release-islamic-state-fighters [https://perma.cc/Z7EP-GDMQ]
(“Now it seems that both triggering conditions for a collapse of the SDF detention system [for
Islamic State fighters] are looming before us, thanks to President Trump’s precipitous
decision to green-light a Turkish invasion of northern Syria.”); Kathy Gilsinan, There Is No
Plan
B
for
ISIS
Prisoners,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
17,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/there-is-no-plan-b-for-isisprisoners/600187/ [https://perma.cc/2LC2-J9CS] (“[T]he U.S. has relied on Kurdish-led militias
to hold some 11,000 ISIS fighters, about 2,000 of whom were ‘foreign fighters.’”).
30. See Daniel L. Byman, What Happens When ISIS Goes Underground?, BROOKINGS INST.
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/18/what-happens-when-isisgoes-underground [https://perma.cc/9LEA-RGVL]; Chesney, supra note 29.
31. See Byman, supra note 30; Chesney, supra note 29; THE SOUFAN GRP., supra note 4,
at 19-21. Due to Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria, the United States military has already
taken custody of Islamic State fighters previously held by the SDF, although none have been
U.S. citizens so far. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Moves to Take ‘High Value’ ISIS Detainees,
Including Britons Who Abused Hostages, N.Y. T I M E S (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10 /0 9 /us /p o l i t i cs /b e a t les - i s is - us - custody.html
[https://perma.cc/A54Q-2XQL].
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Parts I, II.A.
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The idea of an updated AUMF has long been discussed as an
appropriate measure to continue operations against the Islamic
State.35 This Note proposes that because the Islamic State and
al-Qaeda are factually distinct organizations, Congress must pass
a new AUMF that specifically includes the Islamic State in order to
justify detaining individuals like Doe. This Note explores three
principles that would best help execute an Islamic State-specific
AUMF and justify current and future detentions of U.S.-citizen
Islamic State fighters: (1) an explicit reference to the Islamic State
in the AUMF’s language; (2) the inclusion of a sunset clause; and (3)
a provision requiring reports to Congress. The addition of these
provisions to an Islamic State-specific AUMF would resolve any
ambiguity over whether a new AUMF extends to the Islamic State
and, as a result, whether there is a justifiable legal basis for the
detention of its members.
Part I outlines the U.S. government’s authority for detaining Doe
as an enemy combatant. This Part examines the government’s
authority by analyzing constitutional and statutory sources, and the
limitations imposed on this authority. Part II explores the current
theory for including the Islamic State within the scope of the 2001
AUMF, and then outlines the organizational and motivational
differences that make the Islamic State a factually distinct organization and not a “successor” force of al-Qaeda. Part II also addresses
two counterarguments that critics could make in response to this
Note. Part III presents this Note’s suggestions for principles that
should be included in a new Islamic State-inclusive AUMF. This
Part outlines three key principles that would ensure that the
Islamic State is within the scope of the new AUMF, and explains
why these provisions offer a better legal basis for the detention of
U.S.-citizen Islamic State fighters.
35. See Authorization for Use of Military Force 2018, S.J. Res. 59, 115th Cong. (2018)
(bipartisan proposal to “provide[ ] uninterrupted authority to use all necessary and
appropriate force in the current and continuing armed conflict against the Taliban, al Qaeda,
ISIS, and associated forces”); Heather Brandon-Smith, An ISIS AUMF: Where We Are Now,
Where to Go Next, and Why It’s So Important to Get It Right, JUST SECURITY (May 5, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/40549/isis-aumf-now-next-important/ [https://perma.cc/2VDMQRLN]; Jessica Michek, What the AUMF Is and Why You Should Care, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR.
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/what-the-aumf-is-and-why-you-should-care2018/ [https://perma.cc/U5YA-8B3M].
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I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DETENTION OF U.S.-CITIZEN
ISLAMIC STATE FIGHTERS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS
The first prong of Doe’s challenge to his detention was that a clear
statutory grant from Congress is necessary for the government to
detain an American citizen in a noncriminal context.36 Implicit in
this argument is the recognition that, in certain situations, the
government has the authority to detain American citizens in noncriminal contexts.37
This Part considers the sources of the government’s authority to
detain citizens as enemy combatants, and then analyzes Doe’s
argument concerning the restrictions placed on this authority. Part
I.A summarizes the constitutional authority that the government
may rely upon to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. Part I.B
explores the 2002 Iraq AUMF and the 2001 AUMF, which the
government relied upon as statutory authority for detaining U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants. Part I.C analyzes whether the 2001
AUMF satisfies the clear statement requirement of the NonDetention Act, specifically in the context of the detention of U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants because of their membership in a
terrorist organization.
A. Constitutional Authority to Detain Citizens as Enemy
Combatants
The Bush administration first invoked a constitutional justification for a broad detention power after the September 11th terror
attacks. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case concerning the detention of
a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant, the Bush administration
argued that the Commander-in-Chief powers granted by Article II
of the Constitution38 authorized the government to indefinitely
36. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 23, at 5;
Chesney, supra note 16 (“First, [Doe] asserts that an American citizen cannot lawfully be
detained without criminal trial unless there is a clear statutory grant of authority by
Congress for that purpose.”).
37. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 128 (describing the sources of the
“President’s statutory authority to detain individuals in the course of military operations”).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
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detain a citizen as an enemy combatant.39 The government also
argued that the power to detain is a fundamental function of the
President’s role as Commander in Chief.40 While the plurality
acknowledged this argument,41 they did not rule on its merits.42
However, Justice Thomas did treat the detention power as one of
the President’s war powers in his dissenting opinion, illustrating
that at least one Justice found this theory compelling.43 Despite the
lack of a ruling on its merits in Hamdi, the Bush administration
continued to rely on the argument that the ability to detain enemy
combatants fell within the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers
in subsequent cases.44
While the Court has consistently chosen not to rule on the merits
of this argument, it has not expressly denied the merits either.45 As
a result, there has been a broad recognition that the government’s

Army and Navy of the United States.”).
39. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004) (plurality opinion); Brief for the
Respondents at 13-14, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (“The Challenged Wartime Detention Falls
Squarely Within the Commander In Chief’s War Powers.”).
40. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 13, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-6895) (“This case directly involves the President’s core functions as Commander
in Chief in wartime: the capture, detention, and treatment of the enemy.”).
41. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (“The Government maintains that ... the Executive
possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II.”).
42. See id. at 517 (“We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such
authority, however, because we agree with the Government’s alternative position.”).
43. See id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It follows that this power [to wage war by the
national government] ... quite obviously includes the ability to detain those (even United
States citizens) who fight against our troops or those of our allies.” (citations omitted)).
44. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent-Appellee at 35-36, Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v.
Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-7427) (“[T]he President[‘s] war-making powers
... include the authority to capture and detain.”); Opening Brief for the Appellant at 18,
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court erred in holding that the
President lacks the inherent authority as Commander in Chief to detain Padilla as an enemy
combatant”); Jack Goldsmith, Detention, the AUMF, and the Bush Administration—Correcting
the Record, LAWFARE (Sept. 14, 2010, 3:06 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/detention-aumfand-bush-administration-correcting-record [https://perma.cc/J3VH-83GD].
45. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (stating that while the Court
ruled on the petitioners’ access to writs of habeas corpus, the Court’s opinion did not
undermine the “Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517
(plurality opinion) (stating again that the Court did not reach the question of the President’s
authority to detain individuals); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (stating that
the Court did not reach the question of whether the President had the authority to detain
Padilla).
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ability to detain individuals may have its roots in the President’s
Commander-in-Chief powers.46
B. The Government’s Statutory Authority to Detain Citizens as
Enemy Combatants
The government also alleged that its statutory authority to detain
Doe as an enemy combatant stemmed from two separate statutes:
the 2002 Iraq AUMF47 and the 2001 AUMF.48 The 2002 Iraq AUMF
has not been consistently relied upon as a source of authority to
detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. The 2002 AUMF has
predominantly been relied upon to detain individuals in Iraq itself,
with even that authority becoming less relied upon in recent years.49
Additionally, the main cases concerning the detention of a U.S.
citizen as an enemy combatant have implicated the 2001 AUMF
rather than the 2002 Iraq AUMF.50 However, the Islamic State does
have characteristics that may bring it within the scope of the 2002
Iraq AUMF,51 and, as an authorization for use of force, courts are
likely to interpret it similarly to the 2001 AUMF.52 Therefore, this
Part will briefly summarize the 2002 Iraq AUMF and its use in
detention cases, though this Note will primarily focus on the 2001
AUMF.53

46. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 147 (stating that there is broad consensus
that the President’s detention authority rises from his Article II powers).
47. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
48. See Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 17, at 12-20.
49. See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 140-41.
50. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517; Padilla, 542 U.S. at 431.
51. See infra Part I.B.1.
52. See Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 17, at 22 (“The power to detain enemy
combatants under the 2002 Iraq AUMF and the validity of such detentions depend on the
same factors as under the 2001 AUMF.”).
53. A full analysis of the 2002 Iraq AUMF’s applicability to detaining U.S.-citizen Islamic
State fighters is outside the scope of this Note. See Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 140-42
(offering a full analysis of the 2002 Iraq AUMF’s detention authority).
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1. The 2002 Iraq AUMF
Congress passed the Iraq AUMF in 2002 to supply the legal
authorization for the coming invasion and war in Iraq.54 The Iraq
AUMF authorizes the use of the U.S. military against Iraq by allowing the President to use force “as he determines to be necessary
and appropriate” to “(1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce
all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding
Iraq.”55
The Iraq AUMF does not explicitly authorize the detention of
individuals; however, the authorization does not explicitly limit the
types of force that are “necessary and appropriate” to “defend the
national security of the United States” either.56 As a result, the
government’s authority to detain is likely read into this language as
a “necessary and appropriate” use of force in military operations.57
Although the government presumably has the general authority
to detain individuals under the Iraq AUMF, this authority is limited
by the Authorization’s first prong, which states that any force must
be in direct relation to “the continuing threat posed by Iraq.”58 It is
not clear what Congress intended by this term, and legal scholars
have debated this particular issue.59 One view is that the term
54. See MATTHEW C. WEED , CONG . RESEARCH SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 2
(2017).
55. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501.
56. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2076 (2005) (“The Iraq authorization places no apparent
restriction on methods of force.”).
57. Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 140-41. The Supreme Court has held this to be true
for similar language found in the 2001 AUMF. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518
(2004) (plurality opinion) (“We conclude that detention of individuals ... is so fundamental and
accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’
Congress has authorized the President to use.”).
58. See Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 140-41 (internal quotations omitted).
59. Compare Wells Bennett, Congressional Intent, the 2002 AUMF, and ISIS, LAWFARE
(June 13, 2014, 3:32 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/congressional-intent-2002-aumf-andisis [https://perma.cc/43UB-DBHF], with Jack Goldsmith, The 2002 Iraq AUMF Almost
Certainly Authorizes the President to Use Force Today in Iraq (and Might Authorize the Use
of Force in Syria), LAWFARE (June 13, 2014, 11:29 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2002iraq-aumf-almost-certainly-authorizes-president-use-force-today-iraq-and-might-authorize-use
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should be read narrowly as to apply only to those threats posed by
the Saddam Hussein regime, its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, and other threats specifically posed by the Iraqi government.60 Another view argues for a broader reading, claiming that
because the operative language does not make any explicit references to Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi government—just to “Iraq” in
general—the AUMF authorizes force against any “continuing
threat” that involves Iraq.61 This view holds that threats posed by
groups in Iraq, as well as threats to Iraq by groups outside of its
borders, could pose a threat to U.S. national security.62
The ability of the U.S. government to detain individuals under
the Iraq AUMF is directly tied to the interpretation of a “continuing
threat posed by Iraq.” Under the narrow view, the Iraq AUMF no
longer carries any force, and any detention made pursuant to it
would be unlawful.63 However, under a broader interpretation, the
government could presumably detain any individual who poses a
threat that is in any way connected to Iraq.64 While the correct
interpretation of this language has been left undecided, it is apparent that the Iraq AUMF provides the government with detention authority in certain contexts.
2. The 2001 AUMF
Congress passed the 2001 AUMF one week after the September
11th terrorist attacks.65 The 2001 AUMF authorized the President
to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
[https://perma.cc/66T4-BKPA].
60. See WEED , supra note 54, at 2; Bennett, supra note 59 (“Section 3’s reference to ‘Iraq’
might properly be read in a narrower, more government-centric fashion.”).
61. WEED , supra note 54, at 2; Goldsmith, supra note 59.
62. See WEED, supra note 54, at 2; Goldsmith, supra note 59.
63. See Hathaway et al., supra note 12, at 141 (“The purpose-oriented clauses of the
resolution suggest that the document should cease to be a source of legal authority once these
conditions have been met.”).
64. See Goldsmith, supra note 59.
65. See WEED, supra note 10, at 1.
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September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.66

The 2001 AUMF does not contain any language that explicitly
states that detention is a “necessary and appropriate” use of force;
however, the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants has
been confirmed as a valid use of the detention power under the 2001
AUMF.67
The Supreme Court first confronted the question of whether the
2001 AUMF authorized the detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy
combatant in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.68 The case involved the detention
of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a dual U.S.-Saudi citizen who, as an alleged
member of the Taliban, was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan by U.S. allies and transferred to U.S. military custody.69 Hamdi
was later transferred and detained on a military brig in South
Carolina after the government determined that he was a U.S. citizen.70
The U.S. government argued that the 2001 AUMF granted it the
authority to detain Hamdi indefinitely as an enemy combatant
without any “formal charges or proceedings.”71 The government also
argued that the President possessed the authority to detain Hamdi
pursuant to his Article II powers; however, the Court did not reach
this issue, because it found that the AUMF argument answered the
question at hand.72
In response, Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that Hamdi’s status as a U.S. citizen afforded him
66. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).
67. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG . RESEARCH SERV., RL31724, DETENTION OF AMERICAN
CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS 4 (2005) (“The Supreme Court ... affirm[ed] the President’s
authority to detain [a United States citizen] as an ‘enemy combatant’ under the [2001]
AUMF.”).
68. 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
69. Id.
70. Id.; William C. Banks, United States Responses to September 11, in GLOBAL ANTITERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 496 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005). The factual details of
Hamdi’s case are strikingly similar to those of John Doe. See Chesney, supra note 16.
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
72. Id. at 516-17.
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due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and that his indefinite detention violated these rights.73 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that a detainee’s status as a U.S. citizen
did not bar the government from detaining him indefinitely as an
enemy combatant,74 but that the detainee must be afforded the
opportunity to challenge the factual basis of his classification as an
enemy combatant in front of a “neutral decisionmaker.”75 The Court
emphasized that this holding was a narrow one, only answering
whether the detention of citizens who were “part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners ... and who
engaged in an armed conflict against the United States” is authorized.76
In finding that the detention of U.S. citizens was authorized, the
plurality faced Hamdi’s chief legal claim against his detention.
Hamdi argued that the Non-Detention Act (NDA), which requires
that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress,”77 barred his
detention because the 2001 AUMF lacked a clear authorization by
Congress for the indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen.78 The
plurality dismissed this claim, stating that “the [2001] AUMF is
explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals
in the narrow category we describe ... and that the AUMF satisfied”
the NDA’s congressional authorization requirement.79
To answer this question, the plurality first turned to the language
of the AUMF to describe this narrow category, holding that “[t]here
can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United
States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known
to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for
those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing

73. Id. at 511.
74. Id. at 519 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy
combatant.”).
75. Id. at 533.
76. Id. at 516 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 3).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012). Congress enacted the NDA in order to prevent situations
similar to the internment of Japanese citizens during World War II. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
517 (plurality opinion); Chesney, supra note 16.
78. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517, 519.
79. Id. at 517.
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the [2001] AUMF.”80 Next, the plurality concluded that the detention of enemy combatants, in order to prevent their return to
the battlefield, is a “fundamental incident of waging war,” and,
therefore, within the scope of “necessary and appropriate force”
authorized by the 2001 AUMF.81 The plurality reached this conclusion by examining international law-of-war principles.82 Ultimately, the plurality’s holding established that the 2001 AUMF
provided sufficient statutory authorization under the NDA to
detain, for the duration of the conflict, individuals who fell within
the narrow category of persons the plurality described.83
C. The Non-Detention Act Applied in Doe v. Mattis
The plurality in Hamdi “clearly and unmistakably” concluded
that the 2001 AUMF provided the authority to detain a U.S. citizen
as an enemy combatant in “the narrow circumstances” of that case.84
However, the narrow nature of the plurality’s holding left open the
question of whether the same analysis would apply to groups other
than al-Qaeda and the Taliban.85 This was precisely the question
presented in Doe v. Mattis.86
The U.S. government justified Doe’s detention by claiming that
the Islamic State fell within the scope of the 2001 AUMF and,
because Doe is a member of the Islamic State, it had the authority
to detain Doe as an enemy combatant.87 In response, Doe made the
same NDA claim as Hamdi, arguing that the 2001 AUMF should
not be construed as explicit congressional authorization for the
detention of a U.S.-citizen Islamic State fighter.88
Based on the Hamdi plurality, a court faced with this question
would likely find that detention is a “necessary and appropriate” use
80. Id. at 518.
81. Id. at 519 (internal quotations omitted).
82. See id. at 518, 520-21 (“[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of
‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for the duration of the
relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.”).
83. See id. at 519, 521.
84. Id. at 519.
85. See Chesney, supra note 16.
86. See id.
87. See Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 17, at 15.
88. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 23, at 8-9.
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of force under the 2001 AUMF.89 However, the authorization to
detain Doe would only apply if the Islamic State fell within the
scope of the 2001 AUMF as the Taliban did in Hamdi.90 The next
Part of this Note will argue that the Islamic State does not fall
within the scope of the 2001 AUMF because it is factually distinct
from al-Qaeda and, therefore, the 2001 AUMF cannot be relied upon
to detain Islamic State fighters who are U.S. citizens.
II. THE 2001 AUMF AND THE ISLAMIC STATE
The 2001 AUMF authorizes the use of “all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons”
that were either responsible for the September 11th terrorist
attacks or aided or assisted those “organizations or persons” that
were responsible.91 In 2014, the Obama administration designated
the Islamic State as one such organization and commenced a
bombing campaign against the group.92 The Trump administration
has since adopted the same legal theory and concluded that the
2001 AUMF authorizes the use of force against the Islamic State.93
Part II.A will first briefly outline the current legal theory for
including the Islamic State within the scope of the 2001 AUMF.
Next, Part II.B will outline the organizational and operational
differences that make the Islamic State a distinct group from alQaeda and, therefore, a group outside the scope of the 2001 AUMF.
Finally, Part II.C will explore two counterarguments to this theory
and propose responses to each.

89. See Chesney, supra note 16.
90. Id.
91. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).
92. See Obama, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
93. Charlie Savage, U.S. Troops Can Stay in Syria Without New Authorization, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/politics/isis-syria-americantroops.html [https://perma.cc/QZ7L-26EK] (“The executive branch’s core legal theory that it
is authorized by Congress to fight the Islamic State ... was first put forward by the Obama
Administration in 2014 ... [and the executive branch] argue[s] that the war against the
Islamic State is covered by a 2001 law authorizing the use of military force against the
perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks.”).

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020

17

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 61 [2020], Art. 1

18

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 61:001

A. The Current Legal Theory for Including the Islamic State
Within the Scope of the 2001 AUMF
The U.S. government’s current legal theory for including the
Islamic State within the scope of the 2001 AUMF is based upon the
Islamic State’s affiliation with al-Qaeda.94 In 2004, Abu Musab alZarqawi95 pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and thus brought
his terrorist group into affiliation with al-Qaeda.96 Zarqawi’s group,
which would go on to become the Islamic State,97 adopted the name
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and conducted military operations in Iraq
and Syria until 2011.98 The U.S. government claims that because alQaeda has consistently been found to be within the scope of the
2001 AUMF, AQI, and later the Islamic State, also fell squarely
within the scope of the 2001 AUMF during this period of time.99
Recently, al-Qaeda senior leadership (al-Qaeda Central) and the
Islamic State split from each other, but the government claims that
this has had no effect on the Islamic State’s status in regard to the
2001 AUMF.100 The government points to the Islamic State’s statement that it, rather than al-Qaeda Central, “is the true executor of
bin Laden’s legacy,” as proof of their ongoing tie to the original alQaeda organization.101 In essence, the government alleges that alQaeda effectively split into two organizations, and the Islamic State
is al-Qaeda and a “successor” to Osama bin Laden’s legacy, rather
than its own separate organization.102 Thus, since al-Qaeda is still
94. See WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 5
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Legal_
Policy_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPV8-WH4P].
95. Up until this point, Zarqawi had been leading the terror group al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
in terror operations in Iraq. See WARRICK , supra note 2, at 159.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 8.
98. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 94, at 5-6.
99. See id. at 5.
100. See id. at 6 (“The subsequent 2014 split between ISIL and current al Qa’ida leadership
does not remove ISIL from coverage under the 2001 AUMF.”).
101. Id.
102. See Ryan Goodman & Shalev Roisman, Assessing the Claim that ISIL Is a Successor
to Al Qaeda—Part 1 (Organizational Structure), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.
justsecurity.org/15801/assessing-isil-successor-al-qaeda-2001-aumf-part-1-organizationalstructure/ [https://perma.cc/54GG-M8J8] (“[T]he administration’s position is not that ISIL is
an ‘associated force’ of AQ, but instead that ISIL is al-Qaeda itself; ISIL is one of two splinter
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a group that the 2001 AUMF authorizes the use of force against, so
is the Islamic State.
Although this theory highlights some of the connections that
undoubtedly exist between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, it contains factual inaccuracies as to their organizational relationship and
does not account for the distinct operational goals of the two groups.
B. The Islamic State Is Not a Successor Force of al-Qaeda
The Islamic State is not a group that Congress initially authorized force against, and it never truly integrated with al-Qaeda after
the September 11th attacks as the government alleges.103 Despite at
one point taking on the al-Qaeda name,104 the Islamic State has
always been organizationally and operationally separate from alQaeda Central.105
1. The Islamic State is Organizationally Distinct from al-Qaeda
The Islamic State and al-Qaeda have been independent organizations even since their first affiliation with each other. The
Islamic State did not exist at the time of the September 11th attacks.106 In the months leading up to the attacks, Zarqawi, the
Islamic State’s founder, met Osama bin Laden and began to operate
a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan.107 Al-Qaeda funded the
camp, but Zarqawi operated it independently from bin Laden’s
organization—neither swearing allegiance to bin Laden nor fully
groups or a ‘successor.’”).
103. See id. (“It appears that ISIL’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was at best an
associated force of AQ-Central, not part of a unified organization. Hence, it is an added stretch
to claim ISIL is a successor or derivative.”).
104. Zarqawi declared allegiance to bin Laden in 2004 and announced the creation of his
new jihadist group, Tanzim Qaedat al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. See JESSICA STERN & J.M.
BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR 21 (2015). The English translation of Zarqawi’s group
was “al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers,” however, it became commonly known as alQaeda in Iraq. Id.; see also DANIEL BYMAN , AL QAEDA, THE ISLAMIC STATE, AND THE GLOBAL
JIHADIST MOVEMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 163 (2015) (“After ... Zarqawi’s
decision to accept Bin Laden’s leadership, the group became Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two
Rivers, usually referred to as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).”).
105. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 102.
106. See id.
107. See WARRICK , supra note 2, at 67-68.
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accepting al-Qaeda’s ideology.108 The camp included women and
children, and was operated as a “mini Islamic society” rather than
an organized terrorist group.109 Zarqawi operated the camp without
taking part in al-Qaeda’s broader terrorist operations; in fact, bin
Laden did not notify Zarqawi of the September 11th attacks until
after they had been carried out, effectively eliminating any possibility that Zarqawi or his disciples had participated in their planning
or execution.110
After the September 11th attacks, Zarqawi and his disciples did
not flee to Afghanistan with bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda
leadership.111 Instead, they fled to the Iran-Iraq border and joined
another terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam.112 This further illustrates
that Zarqawi was not yet leading his own distinct terrorist organization at the time just after the September 11th attacks.113 When
Congress initially authorized the use of force against al-Qaeda with
the passage of the 2001 AUMF, Zarqawi had not yet founded the
group that would transform into the Islamic State, nor had he or his
followers joined or aided bin Laden in carrying out the September
11th attacks as part of al-Qaeda.114 Therefore, “Congress’ initial
authorization ... did not apply” to the Islamic State at this time.115
After pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004, Zarqawi and AQI
continued to operate independently from bin Laden and his
organization.116 According to an analyst at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, bin Laden “exercised virtually no command and control”
over AQI, and Zarqawi’s group was “always relatively independent
of al-Qaeda central leadership.”117 In 2006, after Zarqawi had died,
AQI established the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which would become
108. See id.
109. Id. at 68.
110. See id. at 68-69 (“Zarqawi was kept in the dark about al-Qaeda’s plans until after the
strikes against New York and Washington.”).
111. See id. at 69.
112. See id. at 69-70.
113. See id.
114. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 102.
115. Id.
116. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 104, at 22 (stating that despite Zarqawi’s pledge of
allegiance to bin Laden, he “continued to act independently of al Qaeda Central”).
117. Marshall Erwin, Is al-Qaeda in Iraq?, JUST SECURITY (June 25, 2014), https://www.
justsecurity.org/12082/guest-post-al-qaeda-iraq/ [https://perma.cc/DW8Q-BTDF].
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the Islamic State that exists today.118 AQI independently established ISI “without the buy-in from al-Qaeda leadership.”119 The
modern Islamic State continued this strain of independent action
when, in 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—the leader of the Islamic
State—refused to follow the orders of al-Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri.120 As of 2014, “[t]he level of direct coordination between
Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan and the group that originally was
known as Al Qaeda in Iraq ... has appeared pretty much dead since
2006.”121 The consistent independent action of the Islamic State and
its predecessor groups, despite leadership changes within the
organization, illustrate that organizational independence has always been a structural characteristic of its relationship with alQaeda Central.122
However, some critics have suggested that the mere affiliation
between the groups and their military operations against the United
States during the Iraq War brought AQI within the scope of the
2001 AUMF.123 But, even if AQI and al-Qaeda were sufficiently
connected to bring the Islamic State within the scope of the 2001
AUMF at that time, the subsequent 2014 split between the Islamic
State and al-Qaeda severed any organizational ties that existed
between the groups.124
The Islamic State and al-Qaeda cut ties in 2014125 due to a disagreement between their two leaders relating to the allegiance of
Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate.126 Baghdadi claimed
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See Barak Mendelsohn, After Disowning ISIS, al Qaeda Is Back on Top, FOREIGN AFF.
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-02-13/after-disown
ing-isis-al-qaeda-back-top [https://perma.cc/M69E-ZGTY].
121. Dan Murphy, Al Qaeda’s Boss Is Fed Up with Al Qaeda’s Syrian ‘Affiliate’ ISIS,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/SecurityWatch/Backchannels/2014/0203/Al-Qaeda-s-boss-is-fed-up-with-Al-Qaeda-s-Syrian-affiliateISIS [https://perma.cc/Y765-HF8A].
122. See WARRICK , supra note 2, at 283-84.
123. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 102 (explaining an analysis of the successor
model by a scholar who holds that it “surely applies to groups and individuals who joined Al
Qaeda after 9/11”).
124. See WARRICK , supra note 2, at 286 (stating that “al-Qaeda refused to have anything
to do with ISIS” after the split); Goodman & Roisman, supra note 102; see also STERN &
BERGER, supra note 104, at 43.
125. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 104, at 43.
126. See Mendelsohn, supra note 120.
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command of Jabhat al-Nusra, which Zawahiri disputed and generally refused to acknowledge.127 Then-Secretary of State John
Kerry argued that this split was superficial, and that the Islamic
State and al-Qaeda Central were merely trying to avoid attacks by
the U.S. military.128 However, seven months prior to Secretary
Kerry’s remarks, U.S. government officials admitted that “there is
no doubt the ban [of the Islamic State] was real and not a ruse.”129
Additionally, the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly
denounced the Islamic State and stated that it was no longer part
of al-Qaeda.130
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, also took
actions that publicly defied al-Zawahiri.131 The split between the
two organizations resulted in clashes between al-Qaeda and Islamic State militants where both groups suffered losses, further
illustrating that the disagreement was not a ploy.132 At the time of
the split, the United States was not involved in military operations
against the Islamic State.133 As a result, once the organizational
ties between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda officially severed, so
did the government’s authority to use military force against the
Islamic State pursuant to the theory that it was organizationally
akin to al-Qaeda and thus covered by the 2001 AUMF.134

127. See id.
128. United States Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of John F. Kerry,
Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State) (“[A] mere publicity stunt to separate yourself ... does
not get you out from under the force of the United States law.”).
129. Karen DeYoung & Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda’s Expulsion of Islamist Group in Syria
Prompts
U.S.
Debate,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
10,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaedas-excommunication-ofislamist-group-in-syria-prompts-high-level-us-debate/2014/02/10/339d8654-8f4e-11e3-b46a5a3d0d2130da_story.html [https://perma.cc/6QZD-SWXM].
130. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 104, at 43 (“ISIS is not a branch of the [al-Qaeda]
group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and [al-Qaeda] is not responsible for
its actions.” (alternation in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting a written statement
from al-Qaeda in February 2014)).
131. See Mendelsohn, supra note 120.
132. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 104, at 43-44 (describing the Islamic State’s violent
response to the split with al-Qaeda); WARRICK , supra note 2, at 284, 286 (describing the
assassination of Zawahiri’s “personal emissary” by Islamic State suicide bombers).
133. See AUMF Hearings, supra note 11, at 3 (statement of Sen. Corker).
134. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 102.
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2. The Islamic State Is Operationally Distinct from al-Qaeda
The U.S. government’s legal theory for applying the 2001 AUMF
to the Islamic State also relies upon the similarity of the Islamic
State’s operational goals to those of al-Qaeda.135 The Obama
administration first used force against the Islamic State in August
of 2014 and claimed that their authority to do so stretched back to
at least 2004.136 Assuming that the Islamic State has a sufficient tie
to the September 11th attacks, in order for this theory to be true, it
must follow that the operational goals of the Islamic State and its
predecessors were to carry out “acts of international terrorism
against the United States” from 2004 until the start of the Obama
administration’s bombing campaign in 2014.137 However, the Islamic
State’s main operational goal before its split with al-Qaeda was
never to attack the United States, and it did not develop such a goal
in the subsequent seven months before the United States began to
use military force against the group.
The merger between Zarqawi’s own terrorist group and al-Qaeda,
which created the Islamic State’s predecessor, AQI, was described
as a “‘marriage of convenience,’ rather than a meeting of the
minds.”138 At the time of the merger, al-Qaeda was focused on
attacking the West, while Zarqawi and his group emphasized local,
sectarian targets.139 This emphasis continued after Zarqawi’s group
seemingly merged with al-Qaeda, with bin Laden specifically
pushing for U.S. targets while “Zarqawi (and those who took his
place after his death in 2006 from a U.S. air strike) emphasized sectarian war and attacks on Sunni Muslims.”140 In fact, in the time
between the start of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2009 and
the commencement of later bombing campaigns in August of 2014,
the Islamic State did not kill a single American.141 The difference in
135. See Ryan Goodman & Shalev Roisman, Assessing the Claim that ISIL Is a Successor
to Al Qaeda—Part 2 (Organizational Goals), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.just
security.org/16003/assessing-claim-isil-successor-al-qaeda-part-2-organizational-goals/
[https://perma.cc/GKG4-NYMD].
136. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 94.
137. Goodman & Roisman, supra note 135.
138. STERN & BERGER, supra note 104, at 21 (internal footnote omitted).
139. See, e.g., BYMAN , supra note 104, at 166; WARRICK , supra note 2, at 7-8.
140. BYMAN , supra note 104, at 166; see also Goodman & Roisman, supra note 135.
141. Goodman & Roisman, supra note 135.
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operational targets between the two groups has been cited as one of
the main reasons for the Islamic State’s 2014 split from al-Qaeda.142
President Obama himself signaled that he did not believe the
Islamic State had intentions to strike against the United States
when, in January of 2014, he explained his understanding that
there is a difference “between the capacity and reach of a bin Laden
... network that is actively planning major terrorist plots against the
homeland” and “jihadists who are engaged in local power struggles
and disputes, often sectarian.”143 Even after the start of the bombing
campaign in 2014, President Obama admitted that the Islamic State
was not planning any attacks against the United States,144 with
U.S. government officials echoing this statement.145 Although the
Islamic State later claimed responsibility for attacks in the United
States,146 the key legal concern is whether the Islamic State posed
a threat to the United States at the time the government first
decided to engage them militarily.147 Based on the group’s own
objectives and statements by U.S. government officials as high
ranking as the President, this threat did not exist prior to the U.S.
government’s use of force against the Islamic State.148
142. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Fighting ISIL Is Not America’s War: Other Countries Should
Lead Coalition Against Islamic State, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2014, 11:11 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/dougbandow/2014/09/13/fighting-isil-is-not-americas-war-other-countries-shouldlead-coalition-against-islamic-state/#76fce1bff9e0 [https://perma.cc/WZ5S-LYZ9].
143. David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distancedavid-remnick [https://perma.cc/ZZP9-FQL6].
144. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept. 10,
2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-presidentisil-1 [https://perma.cc/V6HV-JL57] (“we have not yet detected specific plotting against our
homeland” by the Islamic State).
145. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 135 (quoting then-Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security and the director of the Counterterrorism Center as saying there is “no
credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the U.S.”); Mark Mazzetti et al.,
Struggling to Gauge ISIS Threat, Even as U.S. Prepares to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/struggling-to-gauge-isis-threat-evenas-us-prepares-to-act.html [https://perma.cc/4JBV-QN2Q] (“it is not clear to intelligence
officials that the group even wants to” attack the United States).
146. See Tim Lister et al., ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed 2,043,
CNN (Feb. 12, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacksaround-the-world/index.html [https://perma.cc/886D-6D8F].
147. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 135.
148. See Goodman & Roisman, supra note 135 (“The public record, including the
Administration’s statements, seems to suggest that ISIL, in fact, did not harbor designs to
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Congress passed the 2001 AUMF in order to target those
responsible for the September 11th terrorist attacks and to prevent
those groups from carrying out future attacks against the United
States.149 The government alleges that the 2001 AUMF applies to
the Islamic State because it was organizationally and operationally
unified with al-Qaeda, one of the perpetrators of the September 11th
attacks, and the use of force against them is therefore necessary to
protect the United States.150 However, the Islamic State was organizationally and operationally independent from al-Qaeda before the
United States initiated the use of force against it.151 Thus, the
Islamic State is outside the scope of the 2001 AUMF, and it cannot
be relied upon as the legal basis to detain U.S.-citizen Islamic State
fighters.
C. Counterarguments
Legal scholars who oppose this argument may point to two
counterarguments to illustrate that the government’s authority to
use force against the Islamic State pursuant to the 2001 AUMF is
valid. The first counterargument asserts that Congress has
authorized the use of the 2001 AUMF against the Islamic State by
repeatedly authorizing funds for that purpose.152 The second
counterargument claims that determining which groups fall within
the scope of the 2001 AUMF is a nonjusticiable political question,
and therefore the executive branch is due binding deference in its
determination.153
1. Has Congress Already Authorized the Use of Force
Against the Islamic State?
One argument several critics have asserted is that Congress has
authorized the use of military force against the Islamic State—and
thus the legal authority underlying this use of force—by consistently
attack the United States prior to the US strikes against it.”).
149. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
150. See supra Part II.A.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 94, at 6.
153. See Chesney, supra note 16.
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appropriating funds for the purpose of countering the threat posed
by the Islamic State.154 The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) outlined
this theory in an opinion regarding military hostilities in Kosovo
where the office stated that Congress may authorize military force
through the appropriations process “when the appropriations
measure is directly and conspicuously focused on specific military
action.”155 The OLC stated that “[t]he most conspicuous example of
Congress authorizing hostilities through its appropriations power”
was the appropriation of funds for the Vietnam War.156 Specifically,
the opinion points to President Johnson asking for, and receiving,
$700 million in initial funding to combat military action in Southeast Asia.157 The OLC opinion asserts that because the actual act
appropriating the funds was a special appropriation that only
contained one item—the appropriation of funds for use in military
activities in Southeast Asia—the appropriation was a “clear
congressional endorsement and approval of the actions taken by the
President.”158
After beginning military operations against the Islamic State in
2014, the executive branch has sought—and received—over $10
billion in congressionally appropriated funds to support the fight
against the Islamic State.159 Congress was aware that the 2001
AUMF was the legal authority relied upon to carry out these military operations and still approved these funds over the course of
multiple annual budget cycles.160 Thus, opponents argue that
Congress has authorized the use of military force—and, by extension, detention authority—against the Islamic State under the 2001

154. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 94, at 6 (“Congress has repeatedly and specifically
funded the President’s military actions against ISIL through an unbroken stream of
appropriations over multiple years.”).
155. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 339 (2000)
[hereinafter OLC Opinion].
156. Id. at 335.
157. See id. at 336 (citing Erwin N. Griswold, The Indochina War—Is It Legal?, reprinted
in 117 Cong. Rec. 28,978 (1971)).
158. Id. at 335-36 (quoting Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation
in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474, 487-88 (1966)).
159. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 94, at 6.
160. See id.
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AUMF by appropriating funds to counter the threat posed by the
Islamic State.161
There are two responses to this argument. First, the OLC opinion clearly states that congressional authorization by appropriation only occurs “when the appropriations measure is directly and
conspicuously focused on specific military action.”162 As an example,
the OLC opinion cites the initial $700 million special appropriation that President Johnson received for the Vietnam War.163 This
appropriation came as a stand-alone act that only contained one
item, the appropriation of funds for the Vietnam conflict.164 In
contrast, the first stream of appropriations that President Obama
received for military activities against the Islamic State came as
part of a larger appropriations act that contained funding for a
myriad of governmental agencies and initiatives.165 Inasmuch as the
Act references the Islamic State, it provides that the funds “may
only be used for emergency and extraordinary expenses associated
with activities to counter the Islamic State,” with those activities
including the provision of “training; equipment; logistics support,
supplies, and services; stipends; infrastructure repair, renovation,
and sustainment to military and other security forces ... with a
national security mission, to counter the Islamic State.”166
Unlike the initial appropriations act for the Vietnam War—which
was a stand-alone act that provided funds solely for military activity
in Vietnam—the funds that President Obama received came as part
of a larger package that did not specifically appropriate funds for
the use of military force by the U.S. military against the Islamic
State.167 Instead, the Act focused on training and assisting homecountry military units.168 This is far from the “direct[ ] and conspicuous[ ] focus[ ] on specific military action” that the OLC states is

161. See id. at 3-6.
162. OLC Opinion, supra note 155, at 339.
163. See id. at 336.
164. See id. at 335-36.
165. See WHITE HOUSE , supra note 94, at 6. See generally Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, 2285-95.
166. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, 128 Stat. at 2288,
2290.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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necessary and, therefore, not a situation where congressional
authorization by appropriation occurs.169
The second response to the theory posed by the OLC opinion is
that the Supreme Court has held that congressional appropriations
only act as congressional authorizations in very limited circumstances.170 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Court acknowledged that congressional appropriations are “Acts of Congress,”
but stated that appropriations “have the limited and specific
purpose of providing funds for authorized programs.”171 In other
words, appropriations may only be seen as congressional authorizations if they are appropriating funds to programs already authorized by Congress.172 In contrast, the use of force against the
Islamic State pursuant to the 2001 AUMF is not an already congressionally authorized program. President Obama initiated military strikes against the Islamic State unilaterally without first
securing congressional authorization.173 Therefore, the subsequent
stream of appropriations have not been based off of prior congressional authorization for the use of force against the Islamic State.
Critics may still argue that the congressional authorization came
with the passage of the 2001 AUMF after the September 11th
attacks. However, the scope of the 2001 AUMF is limited to “those
nations, organizations, or persons” who “planned, authorized,
committed, or aided” the September 11th attacks.174 As the organizational and operational distinctions between the Islamic State and
al-Qaeda outlined in this Note illustrate, the Islamic State has
never been one such group.175 Therefore, since Congress did not
initially authorize the use of force against the Islamic State specifically, the subsequent appropriations funding the fight against
them cannot be seen as explicit congressional authorization.

169. OLC Opinion, supra note 155, at 339.
170. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See White House Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 9 (“the President would welcome
congressional support for the administration’s efforts against” the Islamic State).
174. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).
175. See supra Part II.B.
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2. Is Determining Whether the Islamic State Falls
Within the Scope of the 2001 AUMF a Nonjusticiable
Political Question?
Critics have also asserted that determining whether or not an
organization falls within the scope of the 2001 AUMF is a “mixed
question[ ] of law and fact” that represents a political question
outside the realm of judicial review.176 More specifically, the
argument is that the factual questions concerning whether or not
the Islamic State has sufficient enough ties with al-Qaeda (so as to
fall within the scope of the 2001 AUMF) “are not of a type [a c]ourt
is equipped to handle with traditional judicially manageable
standards.”177 Instead, those questions are “sensitive military determinations, presumably made based on intelligence collected on
the ground in a live theatre of combat, and potentially changing and
developing on an ongoing basis.”178 Thus, critics argue that these
determinations should be left to the executive branch and not to
the courts.
The first response to this argument is that courts have regularly
addressed factual questions of whether certain terrorist groups,
and individuals, fell within the scope of the 2001 AUMF.179 An
analysis of whether the Islamic State is an organization that falls
within the scope of the 2001 AUMF would be functionally similar to
the analyses already conducted by courts in those cases.180
Secondly, this theory misapplies the Court’s political question
doctrine by conflating the merits of an argument with its justiciability. The factual arguments posited by the executive branch
176. Chesney, supra note 16.
177. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D.D.C. 2016).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that Hezb-iIslami Gulbuddin is an associated force of the Taliban after outlining the fractious
relationship between the two forces); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 420, 432 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that an individual was part of an al-Qaeda associated force and therefore
covered by the AUMF, based on identification by another member of an organization covered
by the AUMF); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that an
individual was part of al-Qaeda and covered by the AUMF based on his statements of intent,
joining of al-Qaeda forces, and identification as a member by other al-Qaeda members).
180. See Chesney, supra note 16 (stating that this analysis would be akin to cases involving
“GTMO habeas litigation”).
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for establishing a sufficient connection between the Islamic State
and al-Qaeda are arguments that go to the merits of whether
Congress authorized the use of force against the Islamic State with
the passage of the 2001 AUMF.181 If the executive branch can
establish a connection between the two groups, then it would win on
the merits of any case alleging the opposite.
The executive branch’s potential ability to establish such a
connection, however, does not mean a case involving these factual
questions is nonjusticiable. A court may not be faced with determining whether the executive branch’s factual assertions are actually
true. Instead, a court would merely be faced with the question of
whether, if the executive’s factual assertions are true, Congress
authorized the use of force against the Islamic State with the 2001
AUMF.182 This would be “a decision which calls for applying no
more than the traditional rules of statutory construction, and then
applying this analysis to the particular set of facts presented” to the
court.183 The Supreme Court has held that “interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal
courts” and “one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles.”184 To
determine whether the Islamic State is covered by the 2001 AUMF,
a court would merely have to interpret the statute and then apply
that analysis to the facts presented to it—which is clearly a justiciable inquiry.185
Furthermore, even if a court did have to inquire into the factual
assertions concerning the Islamic State’s relationship with alQaeda, that would only require a court to give deference to the
executive branch on the merits.186 A court “could simply accept the
181. See Marty Lederman, DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss in Smith v. Obama, the Case
Challenging the Legality of the War Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY (July 14, 2016), https://www.
justsecurity.org/31984/dojs-motion-dismiss-smith-v-obama-case-challenging-legality-war-isil/
[https://perma.cc/M8MF-DV5K].
182. See Marty Lederman, DOJ Reply Brief in Smith v. Obama, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16,
2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33008/doj-reply-smith-v-obama/ [https://perma.cc/3SRY9LU8].
183. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
184. Id.
185. See Lederman, supra note 182.
186. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Judge Kollar-Kotelly Dismisses Captain Smith’s Suit, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34778/judge-kollar-kotelly-dismissescaptain-smiths-suit/ [https://perma.cc/4LG2-2BBA].
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President’s view of [the Islamic State’s] mission and then determine
whether, if that assessment is correct, the 2001 ... AUMF[ ] authorize[s]” the use of force against them.187
In sum, the theory that the executive branch should be given
binding deference in determining whether or not the 2001 AUMF
authorizes force against the Islamic State, because such an inquiry
presents a nonjusticiable political question, both misapplies the
Court’s political question doctrine and fails to account for the fact
that such analyses have already been conducted by federal courts.
III. THE PROPOSAL: AN ISLAMIC STATE INCLUSIVE AUMF
This Note proposes that Congress must pass a new Islamic Stateinclusive AUMF for the government to detain Islamic State fighters
who are U.S. citizens. By passing a new Islamic State-inclusive
AUMF, Congress will finally provide explicit authorization of the
government’s ability to detain U.S.-citizen Islamic State fighters. In
2014, a group of legal scholars put forward a set of “principles” to
guide Congress in passing a new Islamic State specific AUMF.188
This Note will highlight three principles that will best help Congress execute a new Islamic State AUMF.189

187. Id.
188. See Rosa Brooks et al., Principles to Guide Congressional Authorization of the
Continued Use of Force Against ISIL (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/ISIS-AUMF-Statement-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP6X-TRK3].
189. The three principles outlined in this Part are also principles discussed in a 2015
student Note published in the University of Memphis Law Review. See Gregory A. Wagner,
Note, Warheads on Foreheads: The Applicability of the 9/11 AUMF to the Threat of ISIL, U.
MEM . L. REV. 235, 262-268 (2015). Mr. Wagner’s Note argues that the application of the 2001
AUMF to the Islamic State “is inappropriate and skirts the checks and balances required by
the Constitution,” and proposes that Congress should remedy this imbalance of power with
a new AUMF. Id. at 240. While this Note also proposes the need for a new AUMF that
contains these principles, it argues that a new AUMF is necessary not because of an
imbalance in constitutional powers, but because the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are factually
distinct organizations. Compare Wagner, supra at 238-40, with supra Part II.A-B (describing
the current legal theory for applying the 2001 AUMF to the Islamic State, and arguing that
factual differences with al-Qaeda bring the Islamic State outside the scope of the 2001
AUMF).
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A. Naming the Islamic State
The first principle is that the new AUMF should specifically name
and limit the authorization of force to the Islamic State.190 This
principle is advantageous because it acts as explicit congressional
authorization to use force against the Islamic State and, therefore,
would meet the clear statement requirement set forth in Hamdi.191
Additionally, while acting as clear authorization to detain members
of the Islamic State, this principle will also act as a clear statutory
limit on that detention authority.192 One of the main sources of
ambiguity surrounding the 2001 AUMF was its broad authorization
to use force against the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks,193 and the use of that language to subsequently authorize
force against nebulous, associated groups of those perpetrators.194
By explicitly naming the Islamic State and limiting the use of force
to just that organization, this principle ensures that future questions of applicability to other terror organizations will not arise.
B. Sunset Clause
Congress should also consider implementing a sunset clause in
the new Islamic State-specific AUMF.195 A sunset clause would
“precommit[ ] Congress and the President to revisit the nature and
scope of the very diffuse war against Islamic terrorists on a regular
basis.”196 In other words, a sunset clause would force Congress to
review the fight against the Islamic State and explicitly reauthorize
it after a set period of time.
190. See Brooks et al., supra note 188, at 1.
191. See Chesney, supra note 16.
192. See Brooks et al., supra note 188, at 1.
193. See Chesney, supra note 16.
194. See, e.g., Brooks et al., supra note 188, at 1 (emphasizing that any new AUMF should
clearly address whether or not the authorization extends to “associated forces” of the Islamic
State (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chesney, supra note 16 (discussing the initial
skepticism surrounding the Obama Administration’s use of the 2001 AUMF to justify force
against the Islamic State after its split with al-Qaeda).
195. See Brooks et al., supra note 188, at 2.
196. Jack Goldsmith, Why a Sunset Clause Is Important in Any New AUMF, LAWFARE (Feb.
5, 2015, 10:24 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-sunset-clause-important-any-new-aumf
[https://perma.cc/XFD5-A8QN].
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A sunset clause and its ramifications are significant for multiple
reasons. First, reoccurring authorization eliminates any questions
relating to Congress’s intent to authorize force against the Islamic
State.197 If, for example, Congress enacts an Islamic State AUMF
that sunsets after eighteen months, and then immediately reauthorizes another such authorization after being asked by the President,
there can be no question that Congress still supports the use of force
against the Islamic State. Second, AUMFs have included such
sunset clauses in the past as ways to “require any reauthorization
to take place after an intervening election.”198 By requiring authorization by a new Congress or administration, such a clause would
further eliminate uncertainty surrounding congressional authorization by injecting a measure of political accountability into the
process. In sum, a sunset clause would ensure that Congress has
explicitly authorized the use of force against the Islamic State and,
therefore, would help meet the clear statutory authority requirement from Hamdi.199
C. Reporting Requirement
An Islamic State specific AUMF should also include a reporting
requirement to Congress.200 Such a provision would require the
President to report certain facts and justifications to Congress after
a set period of time, such as a description of the current conflict, any
changes in the parties involved in the conflict, and “any significant
legal analyses regarding the scope of, and legal authority for, U.S.
uses of force.”201
Terrorist organizations are, by their nature, entities that can
quickly change allegiances, identities, and forms.202 Additionally,
military operations are also fast-moving exercises that quickly

197. See Brooks et al., supra note 188, at 2-3.
198. Id. at 2.
199. See Chesney, supra note 16.
200. See Brooks et al., supra note 188, at 3 (“A New AUMF Should Require Greater
Transparency and Congressional Oversight.”).
201. Id.
202. See KIM CRAGIN & SARA A. DALY, THE DYNAMIC TERRORIST THREAT: AN ASSESSMENT
OF GROUP MOTIVATIONS AND CAPABILITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 61-81 (2004).
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change in scope and nature.203 A reporting requirement to Congress
will ensure that Congress is aware of any sudden changes in
military operations and will retain some of Congress’s oversight
ability by allowing it to judge whether operations against the
Islamic State are authorized.204 This will help eliminate uncertainty
in detention cases by again signaling Congress’s continued intent to
authorize the use of force against the Islamic State.
CONCLUSION
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court found that under the
specific facts of that case, the 2001 AUMF constituted an explicit
statutory grant from Congress for the detention of a U.S. citizen as
an enemy combatant.205 Although the Court emphasized the narrow
nature of its decision, that same statutory authority has now been
used as the primary legal authorization to detain a U.S. citizen who
fought for the Islamic State.206 However, because the Islamic State
is, and always has been, a distinct entity from al-Qaeda, Congress
must pass a new Islamic State-inclusive AUMF that will provide the
requisite legal authority for any future detentions of U.S.-citizen
Islamic State fighters. A new Islamic State-inclusive AUMF that
explicitly refers to the Islamic State, includes a sunset clause, and
requires the President to report to Congress, would provide the
government with the requisite clear statutory grant from Congress
to detain U.S.-citizen Islamic State fighters as enemy combatants.
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